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Dear Baptists: We Are All ‘Secularists’ Now

Check out the latest column by Dr. Thomas Kidd, Associate Professor of History at Baylor University, over at the evangelical website Patheos.  Here is a snippet from Kidd’s column titled Thou Shalt Not Say “Jesus”:

Tensions over church-state separation are mounting across America as courts increasingly require the erasure of religion from public spaces. A recent incident at a Campbell County Board of Supervisors meeting in Rustburg, Virginia, illustrated the growing furor: when advised that a July 29 ruling by the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals discouraged sectarian prayers at public meetings, the board made clear their contempt for the court’s judgment. Chairman Steve Shockley addressed the audience and said, “If you’re offended by the name of Christ or Lord and Savior, you are welcome to leave the room.”

Shockley’s response was rude. But his frustration—indeed, his alarm—is understandable. How can judges forbid anyone, even elected officials, from saying certain religious words?

First, the 4th Circuit did not forbid anyone from saying certain religious words.  That’s a complete misrepresentation of the court’s decision (see highlighted passage below).

Note also that Kidd  sees 4th Circuit’s decision invalidating the invocation POLICY of Forsyth County, North Carolina as proof that American courts are “increasingly requir[ing]  the erasure of religion from public spaces.”

So what is this policy that the 4th Circuit invalidated?  We don’t know because Kidd never delves into the details of the decision.

Later, Kidd invokes Jefferson and concludes that Jefferson could not have “imagined the day when judges would construe the First Amendment as restricting the religious speech of elected official, private citizen, or clergy.”

Again, the reader has to take Kidd at his word that this decision actually does what he says it does.

Here is a description of the 4th Circuit’s decision by Don Byrd:

The 4th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals today upheld a trial judge’s ruling, and agreed with the position of the Baptist Joint Committee (quoting the BJC’s brief in spots), that the invocation policy of North Carolina’s Forsyth County Commission violates the Establishment Clause. Despite the neutrality of the policy’s text – which allowed for clergy of any faith to deliver an invocation – its practical application resulted in the consistent promotion of Christianity, the Court found. The 2-1 majority fell in line with the longstanding interpretation of Supreme Court precedent in Marsh that insists legislative prayer can pass constitutional muster only by being nonsectarian, without promoting a single faith above others.

And below are snippets from the actual decision:

..[w]hile legislative prayer has the capacity to solemnize the weighty task of governance and encourage ecumenism among its participants, it also has the potential to generate sectarian strife. Such conflict rends communities and does violence to the pluralistic and inclusive values that are a defining feature of American public life. The cases thus seek to minimize these risks by requiring legislative prayers to embrace a non-sectarian ideal. That ideal is simply this: that those of different creeds are in the end kindred spirits, united by a respect paid higher providence and by a belief in the importance of religious faith….

The case law thus sets out clear boundaries. As amicus Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty puts it, “this [c]ourt’s legislative prayer decisions have recognized that the exception created by Marsh is limited to the sort of nonsectarian legislative prayer that solemnizes the proceedings of legislative bodies without advancing or disparaging a particular faith.” Put differently, legislative prayer must strive to be nondenominational so long as that is reasonably possible — it should send a signal of welcome rather than exclusion. It should not reject the tenets of other faiths in favor of just one. Infrequent references to specific deities, standing alone, do not suffice to make out a constitutional case. But legislative prayers that go further — prayers in a particular venue that repeatedly suggest the government has put its weight behind a particular faith — transgress the boundaries of the Establishment Clause. Faith is as deeply important as it is deeply personal, and the government should not appear to suggest that some faiths have it wrong and others got it right.

On a broader level, and more importantly, citizens attending Board meetings hear the prayers, not the policy. What this means is that we cannot turn a blind eye to the practical effects of the invocations at issue here. The dissent suggests that the “frequency of Christian prayer” was merely the “product of demographics,” post at 42, and the County “could not control whether the population was religious.” What the dissent offers as a defense of the policy, however, is one of the problems with it. Take-all-comers policies that do not dis- courage sectarian prayer will inevitably favor the majoritarian faith in the community at the expense of religious minorities living therein. This effect creates real burdens on citizens — particularly those who attend meetings only sporadically — for they will have to listen to someone professing religious beliefs that they do not themselves hold as a condition of attendance and participation. “To . . . Jewish, Muslim, Bahá’i, Hindu, or Buddhist citizens[, ]a request to recognize the supremacy of Jesus Christ and to participate in a civic function sanctified in his name is a wrenching burden.” Such burdens run counter to the essential promise of the Establishment Clause.

You can read the entire decision here.

Kidd alleges that this decision is an example of “church-state extremism.”

If someone wants to disagree with the court’s reasoning, fine.  But if you’re going to paint the decision as “church-state extremism,” shouldn’t you first attempt to deal with the actual decision?

Extremism is a big charge.

Ironically, Kidd’s last article at Patheos called for “sober discussion”  on church-state issues.  Yet, this article offers a Christians vs. secularists narrative that characterizes Christian supporters of the decision as “secularists.” Not helpful.

Last I checked, Baptists through the work of the Baptist Joint Committee – which represents Seventh-Day Baptists, American Baptists, Virginia Baptists, Texas Baptists, Missouri Baptists and the three major African-American Baptist groups – have consistently opposed policies that have the effect of promoting one religion over another.

Apparently though, we BJC-supporting Baptists are “secularists” now….

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Discussion

  1. K Gray says:

    This is 100% about the name of Jesus Christ. Use “Jesus” in prayer, and the ACLU, BJC and courts will invalidate it. Omit Jesus and no lawsuit.

    From the

    “[Forsythe County] Commissioners have been fighting the case since March 2007, when a lawsuit was filed by the ACLU. The suit argued prayers referring to a specific deity at public meetings are unconstitutional. The lawsuit stated a majority of prayers delivered by religious leaders in 2006 ended by using the name Jesus Christ.”

    Forsythe County’s policy allowed many entities to pray: “clerks to the county commissioners had sent letters to hundreds of churches every year for more than 30 years. The letters, sent to any church listed in the phone book, offered church leaders a chance to lead prayer before the meetings.”

    So despite Forsythe County’s neutral policy, it is the actual prayers in the name of Jesus that ACLUE and BJC oppose as unconstitutional. So now, if no invitee shows up to pray and commissioners want to open in prayer, they apparently can’t say ‘Jesus.’

    This is probably why the NYC 9/11 remembrance will be secular, with no clergy participation, invocation or prayer. Case in point.

    Wouldn’t it also be easier and less expensive if Forsythe County commissioners — commissioners everywhere — just dropped prayer? Then the ACLU and BJC would not oppose their mention of Jesus.

    Kidd’s point is valid.

  2. K Gray says:

    Quotes are from the local Fox8 news report online, which notes the County Commissioners are appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court.

  3. Did you bother to read the decision? Or at least the snippets that I included here in this post?

    I don’t care what the ACLU argued in its original lawsuit. That’s irrelevant. I’m not defending the church-state philosophy of the ACLU.

    Show me where in the decision the court banned anyone from “saying certain religious words.”

    Do better than quoting me the reporting of a local Fox affiliate.

    But here’s the important quote that you overlooked:

    “Infrequent references to specific deities, standing alone, do not suffice to make out a constitutional case. But legislative prayers that go further — prayers in a particular venue that repeatedly suggest the government has put its weight behind a particular faith — transgress the boundaries of the Establishment Clause.”

    The BJC opposed the Forsyth POLICY because its practical application resulted in the consistent promotion of Christianity…

    The Forsyth case was about legislative prayer. The 9/11 event is not about legislative prayer.

  4. K Gray says:

    I’ve now read the facts of this interesting case.

    The Fourth Circuit’s discussion makes clear that the way to pass constitutional muster, even if county policy is neutral, is to “remove all references to Christ.” (It may be OK to say ‘the Almighty’ for example). The plaintiffs — two women who attended some county commissioners’ meetings — complained specifically that the prayers they heard contained Christian doctrine and the name of Jesus. The ACLU obtained recordings of commissioners’ meetings which confirmed that more than half the prayers referenced Jesus or ‘our Lord’ or the like. That was the problem — the name of Jesus.

    BJC, ACLU and Americans United for the Separation of Church and State prevailed in making sure Jesus is not mentioned.

    The court’s decision is now rule of law in counties and gov’t entities in 5 mid-Atlantic states: NC, SC, VA, WV and MD. Some counties are already changing any noncompliant practices.

    And Forsyth County commissioners dropped prayer altogether in 2010, when a lower court first ruled against their amended neutral policy. It’s secular now.

    Col. 1:16!

  5. Would you have an objection to a prayer policy in say Dearborn, Michigan that had the practical effect of consistently promoting Islam?

  6. K Gray says:

    If a Muslim opened the legislative session in the name of Allah, that would present the thorny theological issue whether invoking Allah is the same in effect as invoking God or ‘the Almighty.’

  7. You didn’t answer the question.

    I asked if you would have an objection to a prayer policy that – when applied – had the practical effect of consistently promoting Islam.

    Same scenario as the Forsyth situation except that the community has a majority non-Christian faith such as Islam.

  8. That’s certainly not a far-fetched scenario considering the current religious landscape and the increasing diversity.

    Had the court affirmed the Forsyth policy, that decision would have had real implications and allowed for outcomes that evangelicals would not be comfortable with…

  9. K Gray says:

    As is, the decision does have real implications and allows for outcomes with which many evangelicals will not be comfortable. But I agree that the Dearborn hypothetical is not far-fetched.

    And my answer to your question is, I don’t know. Our history, traditions, practices and caselaw are not Muslim — nor were they neutral, until recently. This is new-ish territory.

  10. So religious liberty for me but not for thee?

    Preference for Christians and Christianity is not a new idea of course. But that view is certainly inconsistent with the Baptist heritage.

    As to neutrality, evangelical scholars from Stephen Monsma to Carl Esbeck have long advocated for a form of neutrality – substantive neutrality – that rejects the preferentialism you suggest Christians should enjoy due to history, tradition, practices, etc.

  11. K Gray says:

    I certainly hope people click the link and read the case, as you advised.

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